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1 Introduction
Tax administrations rely generally on income and wealth self-reports from taxpayers.
This occurs for self-employed workers but also, up to a point, for all citizens with side
sources of revenue, that should be integrated in the declaration of taxable wealth. Fur-
thermore, citizens can reduce their tax liability by eluding taxes and inﬂating the amount
of deductions they are entitled to. Taxpayers have a clear incentive to misreport their in-
come/wealth, in order to reduce their liability. Losses to public budgets from tax evasion
are indeed signiﬁcant: the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for example, estimates the
tax gap in 2001 at U$D 345 billion, i.e., almost 16% of the total tax revenue (IRS, 2006).1
The main tool in the hand of the tax administration to limit possible misbehaviour is
to audit taxpayers and verify the information provided. Audits being costly,2 the tax
administration generally selects the reports to be audited. Assessed misreporting may
result in penalties and ﬁnes; the setting up of penalty schemes also satisﬁes an objective
of both horizontal and vertical equity among taxpayers. On top of tax rates, an optimal
tax policy includes therefore an audit strategy and a scheme of penalties.
This gives rise to interesting questions, that we aim at analysing, about the optimal
audit strategies and penalty schemes, and the nature of interactions between tax rates
and audit strategies. For that, we need to take into account taxpayers' attitude toward
risk and uncertainty. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) are the ﬁrst to analyse tax evasion
as a decision under uncertainty. Since then, several authors studied this risky decision in
the framework of Expected Utility Theory (EUT).3 Although EUT has been considered
for long time the most convenient framework (mainly because of its tractability and nice
mathematical properties), there is a growing consensus about the need of an alternative
theory of the agents' behaviour under uncertainty.4
Pioneered by nobel laureate D. Kahneman (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), Prospect
Theory (PT) has become one of the most prominent alternatives to EUT, and it is widely
used both in theoretical and in empirical research.5 According to PT, agents well-being
depends on the distance between the ﬁnal income and a predetermined reference income.
The reference income is the point for which the utility of an agent is equal to zero. For
an income lower than this point, the utility is negative. For a larger one, it is positive.
Agents think of gains and losses relative to this reference point. This phenomenon is
known in cognitive sciences as the reference dependence.6
According to PT, the payoﬀ function diﬀers from the standard EUT one in three di-
mensions. Besides reference dependence, it shows diminishing sensitivity, meaning that
agents marginal utility decreases in the distance from the reference. The consequence
of that is that the payoﬀ function is concave for gains (above the reference) and con-
vex for losses (below it). Furthermore, in incorporates the loss aversion phenomenon:
individuals care generally more about potential losses than potential gains, hence the
disutility of a loss is larger than the utility of a gain of the same magnitude. Cumula-
tive Prospect Theory introduces a further element of distinction from EUT: probability
weighting. According to it, agents assign weights to objective probabilities transforming
1The ﬁeld experiment in Kleven et al. (2011) shows that tax evasion in Denmark mostly concern
self-reported income. However, third-party employed workers may still evade or avoid part of their
tax allowance, through deductible expenses, or when declaring their wealth or their investments. For
more on tax compliance and on the shadow economy, see Schneider (2005), Slemrod (2007), Buehn and
Schneider (2012) and Alm (2012).
2Wages, the formation of the tax administration agents, and the incentive problems related to their
corruptibility are amongst the main source of cost (Hindriks et al., 1999).
3See Andreoni et al. (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), Sandmo (2012).
4See, for instance, Mirrlees (1997).
5See Yaniv (1999), Camerer (2000), Camerer and Loewenstein (2003), or Rablen (2010). Hashimzade
et al. (2012) and Barberis (2013) provide interesting surveys on PT.
6See Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
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them, in the words of Prelec (1998), into decision weights. Prospect theory is nowa-
days commonly used in cognitive sciences and has become one of the standards in the
behavioural economics literature.7
The recent literature on taxation highlights problems in using the Expected Util-
ity Theory setting for tax evasion decision issues, because it contradicts the empirical
evidence in several ways. In particular, with a reasonable degree of risk aversion, it over-
estimates the willingness of agents to misreport their income, therefore, it predicts more
tax evasion than what really occurs. Subjective probabilities under Prospect Theory al-
low us to easily overcome this issue.8 Furthermore, under the assumption of Decreasing
Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA), Expected Utility Theory predicts that an increase in
the tax rate leads to a decrease in tax evasion (the so called Yitzhaki paradox).9 As
a consequence, we observe a growing interest for Prospect Theory within the taxation
literature. Kanbur et al. (2008) study the optimal non-linear taxation under Prospect
Theory, and show that the standard Mirrlees (1974) results are modiﬁed in several in-
teresting ways. Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007) apply Prospect Theory to the taxpayers'
decision to evade taxes, and show that predictions are both quantitatively and qualita-
tively more in line with the empirical evidence than under Expected Utility Theory. In
Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2010) the tax rate is endogenous: one main ﬁnding is that the
best description of the data is obtained by combining taxpayers behaving according to
Prospect Theory and the government acting as predicted by EUT.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst attempt to analyse the optimal audit
scheme, assuming that agents behave according to PT. For the case of EUT, this was
analysed in Chander and Wilde (1998), Chander (2004, 2007), and Cremer and Gahvari
(1996). The latter focus on the moral hazard problem occurring when the labour sup-
ply choice is endogenous. In Chander and Wilde (1998), the authors characterise the
optimal tax schedule in the presence of enforcement costs and clarify the nature of the
interplay between optimal tax rates, audit probabilities and penalties for misreporting.
In particular, under the assumption of risk neutral expected-utility-maximiser taxpayers,
they show that the optimal tax function must generally be increasing and concave. This
is because a progressive tax function implies stronger incentives to misreport and thus it
calls for larger audit probabilities. Chander (2004, 2007) studies the same issues for the
case of risk averse taxpayers, when the incentive to misreport is weaker. By introducing
a measure of aversion to large risks, he shows that the optimal tax function is increasing
and concave if the taxpayer's aversion to such large risks is decreasing with income.
Our paper extends the optimal tax enforcement literature, considering agents that
behave according to PT. We show that the second best solution for the tax authority is
to enforce a regressive tax system, since any other system would be incentive compatible.
We do that using a mechanism design setting, in which, through the revelation principle,
we show the optimal (second best) audit scheme in a truth-telling mechanism. Clearly,
this need not to be the unique way to reach a second best optimum, but by the revelation
principle we can ensure that it cannot exist a not truth-telling mechanism such that the
authority can implement a better audit scheme. In our equilibrium, the tax agency
audits agents which in equilibrium are always declaring all their income. This can seem
odd at ﬁrst, but it's a standard consequence of the truth-telling mechanisms. Audit is
used as a deterrent, and the agency needs to audit in order to guarantee truth-telling
reports.10
7See, for instance, Frank (1997), List (2003, 2004) and Post et al. (2008).
8See Hashimzade et al. (2012).
9See Yitzhaki (1974) and Trannoy and Trotin (2010).
10Notice that the way we construct and solve the model does not guarantee that the equilibrium will
be unique, indeed, the tax authority can induce several equilibria, and those may depend on whether
we consider pure strategy or mixed strategy equilibria. What we ﬁnd is the second-best solution that
can be achieved by the authority by designing a truth-telling mechanism. We can ensure that no other
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Reference dependence is a crucial element in PT. To deﬁne a general reference income,
the most natural choice is to restrict the attention, setting the legal income (i.e., the after-
tax disposable income, under no tax evasion) as a lower-bound and the pre-tax income
as an upper-bound. We show that the optimal audit probability function is always
non-increasing. Concerning the optimal tax function, we show that it is always non-
decreasing and concave when the pre-tax income is used as a reference. Nevertheless, for
the same result to hold when the reference income is the legal one, we need to impose a
further restriction. We show that a suﬃcient condition is to have Decreasing Absolute
Risk Aversion (DARA). This is in line with the results in Chander and Wilde (1998) and
Chander (2004) for the EUT case, but if agents behave according to PT, those properties
hold under a set of less restrictive assumptions.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes a general model of
income tax enforcement under Prospect Theory and introduces the deﬁnition of an op-
timal tax and audit scheme. Sections 3 and 4 solve the model using as the reference
income respectively the legal income and the pre-tax income. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Taxpayers' income w is a random variable with distribution function g, deﬁned over the
interval [0, w¯], with w¯ > 0. The tax administration knows g but not w. Following Prospect
Theory, a taxpayer considers possible outcomes relative to a certain reference point11
when sending a message x ∈ [0, w¯], (i.e., declaring income) to the tax administration.12
For a reference income R, a taxpayer considers larger outcomes as gains and lower as
losses. The payoﬀ function u is:
i. continuous on R, twice continuously diﬀerentiable on R∗\{0} and equal to zero in
zero: u(0) = 0,
ii. increasing, convex for losses and concave for gains: u
′
> 0 on R∗, u′′ > 0 on R∗−
and u
′′
< 0 on R∗+ (Diminishing sensitivity),
iii. steeper for losses than for gains: u
′
(−k) > u′(k) for k ∈ R∗+ (Loss aversion).
Figure 1 represents a typical payoﬀ function.
The tax administration sets up a mechanism, consisting of a set X ⊂ [0, w¯] of
messages (i.e., income declarations), a tax function t : X → R+, twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, an audit probability function p : X → [0, 1], and a penalty function
f : [0, w¯]×X → R+. A taxpayer with initial income w and sending the message x ∈ X, is
audited with probability p(x) and pays t(x) ∈ R+ if no audit occurs, or f(w, x) ∈ [t(x), w]
if an audit occurs.13 The associated payment function for taxpayers is deﬁned by:
r(w, x) = (1− p(x))t(x) + p(x)f(w, x), for all (w, x) ∈ [0, w¯]×X. (1)
Audits are assumed to be costly, c being the cost for an audit. Ceteris paribus, the
tax administration then prefers smaller audit probabilities to reduce audit costs.
The reference income, to which the taxpayer compares his ﬁnal income, is a function
of his initial income. The shape of R may depend on i) the price the taxpayer is willing
to pay for public goods (which can be expressed as a function of the tax rate), and ii)
mechanism can be better for the authority, but there may be other (not truth-telling) mechanisms
yielding the same tax proceeds, in which agents behave diﬀerently.
11On the opposite, what matters in EUT is only the absolute value of the outcome.
12See, for example, Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
13It is assumed that if an audit occurs, the actual income of the taxpayer is discovered without error.
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Outcome
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Figure 1: Utility of an outcome
the characteristics of the cheating game to which he subjects himself by not declaring
his entire income (i.e., the probability of audit and the penalty function):
R = Rt,p,f (w) ∈ [0, w]. (2)
Taxpayers have limited liability: they cannot pay more than their true income. This
rules out full-information optima with large penalties. A feasible mechanism (X, t, p, f)
is such that for any message that a taxpayer can send, the payment is never larger than
his initial income. The mechanisms that satisfy the following requirements are called
direct revelation mechanisms:
i. First feasibility requirement: For all w ∈ [0, w¯], the set of feasible messages
X(w) = {x ∈ [0, w], t(x) ≤ w} contains at least one element and for all x ∈ X(w),
f(w, x) ≤ w.
ii. Second feasibility requirement: The maximisation problem of the taxpayer,
max
x∈X(w)
[V (x)] ,
where the value function V (x) is deﬁned as V (x) = (1−p(x))u(w− t(x)−R(w))+
p(x)u(w − f(w, x)−R(w)), has a solution for all w ∈ [0, w¯].
A direct revelation mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if it is optimal
for each taxpayer to report his income truthfully. The revelation principle applies to
this setting. The principle guarantees the existence of a solution for the maximisation
problem as deﬁned in the second feasibility requirement, and it allows to conﬁne the
attention to the incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms.
Proposition 1. For each direct revelation mechanism (X, t, p, f), there exists a scheme
(t
′
, p
′
, f
′
) such that (X, t
′
, p
′
, f
′
) is an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism,
and the two are equivalent from the point of view of both the tax administration and each
taxpayer.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Without loss of generality, our attention can be conﬁned to mechanisms in which
taxpayers declare their income and they are provided with suﬃcient incentives to be
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rational for them to report truthfully. Taking into account the feasibility requirements
mentioned above, the incentive compatible (IC) direct revelation mechanism is a scheme
(t, p, f) such that for all w ∈ [0, w¯] :
IC1. t(w) ≤ w,
IC2. f(w, x) ≤ w, for all x ∈ X(w),
IC3. (1− p(w))u(w − t(w)−R(w)) + p(w)u(w − f(w,w)−R(w)) ≥
(1− p(x))u(w − t(x)−R(w)) + p(x)u(w − f(w, x)−R(w)), for all x ∈ X(w).
The third condition, henceforth incentive constraint, says that the value function of
the taxpayer is maximised when reporting income truthfully.
With an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms, the payment function
for the taxpayers is deﬁned by:
r(w) = (1− p(w))t(w) + p(w)f(w,w), for all w ∈ [0, w¯]. (3)
We assume that the objective of the tax administration is to maximise tax proceeds
net of audit costs:14
max
r,p
[∫ w¯
0
r(w)g(w)dw − c
∫ w¯
0
p(w)g(w)dw
]
. (4)
Denote by F the set of incentive compatible direct revelation mechanisms. Following
Chander and Wilde (1998), a scheme (t, p, f) is eﬃcient in F if there is no other scheme
(t
′
, p
′
, f
′
) ∈ F such that p′ ≤ p, r′ ≥ r and r′ 6= r or p′ 6= p, where r and r′ are
the payment functions corresponding to (t, p, f) and (t
′
, p
′
, f
′
). This means that we
cannot reduce a taxpayer's audit probability without either increasing someone else's
audit probability or negatively aﬀecting tax proceeds. Also, we cannot raise the payment
at some income level without either lowering the payment at some other levels of income
or increasing some audit probabilities.
Notice that an optimal scheme maximises the tax administration's total proceeds,
net of audit cost, and by deﬁnition it is eﬃcient.
3 When the reference income is the legal income
Through this section, the reference income is assumed to be the legal after-tax income:
R(w) = w − t(w). Therefore, the taxpayer is in the domain of gains as soon as he pays
less than the amount of tax initially planed for him, and in the domain of losses as soon
as he pays more. Under this assumption, propositions 2 and 3 identify the characteristics
of an eﬃcient scheme (t, p).
As a speciﬁcity of the use of Prospect Theory, when maximising the value function of
the taxpayer V (x), with x ∈ X(w), the second order condition may not hold. However,
conditions under which the solution is interior can be highlighted. Indeed, since V (w) =
0, the following conditions are suﬃcient for an interior solution:
V (0) ≥ 0⇔ (1− p(0))u(t(w)− t(0)) + p(0)u(t(w)− w) ≥ 0 (5)
and V
′
(0) > 0⇔ p′(0) [u(t(w)− w)− u(t(w)− t(0))]
14Although it is reasonable to assume that a tax administration may be only interested in maximising
tax proceeds, it is fair to admit that the government may have a diﬀerent objective function. For
tractability reasons, we cannot solve the problem for a generic social welfare function, but our results
are robust to changes in the administration objective. For more on that, see Border and Sobel (1987)
and Chander and Wilde (1995, 1998).
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−t′(0)(1− p(0))u′(t(w)− t(0)) > 0 (6)
With the present reference income, the incentive constraint deﬁned in IC3 is:
p(w)u(t(w)− f(w,w)) ≥ (1− p(x))u(t(w)− t(x)) + p(x)u(t(w)− f(w, x)),
for all x ∈ X(w). (7)
Lemma 1. This incentive constraint can be rewritten as
(1− p(x))u(t(w)− t(x)) + p(x)u(t(w)− w) ≤ 0, for all x ∈ X(w). (8)
Proof. See the Appendix.
It can be noticed in particular that f(w,w) = t(w) and f(w, x) = w as soon as x 6= w.
F is the set of all schemes (t, p) that satisfy conditions IC1. and IC2. for an incentive
compatible direct revelation mechanism and the new incentive constraint (8). An eﬃcient
scheme in F is now a scheme (t, p) for which there is no other scheme (t
′
, p
′
) ∈ F such
that t
′ ≥ t, p′ ≤ p and t′ 6= t or p′ 6= p.
The following monotonicity and concavity results hold for any eﬃcient (henceforth
optimal) scheme.
Lemma 2. A scheme (t, p) ∈ F is eﬃcient in F only if the incentive constraint for each
income level w ∈ [0, w¯] is binding at some x ∈ X(w).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2. A scheme (t, p) ∈ F is eﬃcient in F only if t is non-decreasing and p
is non-increasing.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3. If for all wˆ ∈ [0, w¯], there exists an aﬃne function lwˆ on [0, w¯] such that for
all w ∈ [0, w¯], lwˆ(w) ≥ t(w) and lwˆ(wˆ) = t(wˆ), then t is concave.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The ﬁrst claim of this proposition (i.e., t is non-decreasing) is in line with what we
would expect. The tax to be paid should at least not decrease with income, otherwise it
would generate an incentive to over-declare income. As for the second one, the idea is
that the probability of audit should not increase with the declared income. This result
implies that taxpayers with a lower income w are more likely to be audited, but this is not
the aim of the scheme. The intuition for p to be non-increasing is that the tax authority
is willing to audit more the taxpayers declaring lower incomes and not those earning
less. Hence, the administration observes agents who are identical in all the observable
characteristics, and it expects that a fraud is more likely to occur when the reported
income is low.
Proposition 3 further characterises an eﬃcient scheme (t, p). For that we need ﬁrst
to deﬁne risk aversion in Prospect Theory. The incentive constraint (8), when binding,
requires the utility of an agent to be the same when declaring all his income and when
not. This can be seen as a lottery with an expected utility equal to zero, where gambling
the legal income w − t(w) against the gap between the two tax levels t(w) − t(x). To
measure risk aversion we use the standard Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion measure:
rA(k) = −u
′′
(k)
u′(k)
, for all k ∈ R∗.15 (9)
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Because agents utility is increasing in its argument (i.e., the payoﬀ function is increasing
in income), the sign of rA(k) depends on the sign of the second derivative. Indeed, while
the standard assumption in EUT is that the second derivative is negative (agents are
risk-averse at all levels of income), under Prospect Theory u
′′
takes negative values in
the domain of gains (i.e., u is concave at any point above the reference) and positive
values in the domain of losses (i.e., u is convex at any point below the reference).
Proposition 3. If u satisﬁes DARA, then a scheme (t, p) ∈ F is eﬃcient in F only if
t is concave.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that under decreasing absolute risk aversion, a necessary con-
dition of all eﬃcient schemes is that the tax function is not only non-decreasing (as
required by proposition 2) but also concave.16 This result can be seen as a result of the
standard rent enjoyed by the top type in mechanism design. For the incentive compati-
bility constraint to be satisﬁed, agents with higher income enjoy a rent. Indeed, keeping
the tax relatively high for low incomes, and relatively low for high income, reduces the
incentives of high income agents to misreport their true income, which therefore reduces
the incentives of high income taxpayers to misreport, and therefore it allows the tax
administration to reduce their auditing expenditure.
Deﬁne by y = w − t(x) − R(w) the after tax income, net of the Reference income,
in case the tax payer is not audited, and deﬁne −z = w − f(w, x)− R(w) the after tax
income, net of the Reference income, in case of audit. Under prospect theory, the payoﬀ
function u satisﬁes decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) in p ∈]0, 1[, on R∗+, if z is
increasing in y ∈ R∗+ at a non-decreasing rate, where z is implicitly deﬁned by equation
(10):
(1− p)u(y) + pu(−z) = 0. (10)
Notice that, in the setting of Prospect Theory, z is always increasing with y. Fur-
thermore, the concavity condition generally holds. This is the case, for instance, of the
power utility function in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) used to describe the behaviour
of individuals under risk:
u(k) =
{
kα if k ≥ 0,
−µ(−k)α if k < 0, (11)
where 0 < α < 1, and µ > 1 because of loss aversion.17
The concavity condition in Equation 9 is equivalent to:
(1− p) | rA(−z) |
u′(−z) ≥ p
| rA(y) |
u′(y)
, (12)
where y and z are deﬁned by (10). This means that, weighted by probability coeﬃcients,
the risk loving behaviour in case of loss must be larger than the risk aversion in case of
gain. This condition is very weak and easily holds, because p is usually very close to
zero.
15This measure can also be deﬁned on 0 in this manner: rA(0−) = −u
′′
(0−)
u
′
(0−)
and rA(0+) = −u
′′
(0+)
u
′
(0+)
.
16An analogous result is obtained in Chander and Wilde (1998) for the case of Expected Utility Theory.
17From the experiment in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the authors suggest, for instance, that
reasonable values would be α = 0.88 and µ = 2.25.
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4 When the reference income is the initial income
In this section we consider the initial income as the reference income: R(w) = w. This
case corresponds to an extremely tax-averse taxpayer. This implies that any payment to
the tax administration always lies in the loss domain, therefore the taxpayer is risk-lover.
Even though the conditions for an interior solution can not been extended to this
extreme case, the continuity of the model suggests that for all R between the legal income
and the initial income, such conditions hold. The present case must be considered as the
extreme case among all possible.
The incentive constraints with this reference income becomes:
(1− p(w))u(−t(w)) + p(w)u(−f(w,w)) ≥ (1− p(x))u(−t(x)) + p(x)u(−f(w, x)),
for all x ∈ X(w). (13)
Similarly to what we did for the previous case, the incentive constraint can be weak-
ened.
Lemma 4. The incentive constraint is equivalent to:
u(−t(w)) ≥ (1− p(x))u(−t(x)) + p(x)u(−w), for all x ∈ X(w). (14)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Here again, f(w,w) = t(w) and f(w, x) = w if x 6= w. F is now the set of all
schemes (t, p) that satisﬁes conditions IC1. and IC2. for an incentive compatible direct
mechanism, and the incentive constraint (14). The notion of eﬃciency is the same as
before.
Then, optimal schemes are characterised by the following monotonicity and concavity
results.
Lemma 5. A scheme (t, p) ∈ F is eﬃcient in F only if the incentive constraint for each
income level w ∈ [0, w¯] is binding at some x ∈ X(w).
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for Lemma 2.
Proposition 4. A scheme (t, p) ∈ F is eﬃcient in F only if t is non-decreasing, p is
non-increasing and t is concave.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Results are very similar to those of Section 3 and the same intuitions hold. However,
under the current framework, we do not need additional assumptions about the shape
of the payoﬀ function to ensure that the tax function of a revenue maximising scheme is
concave. This comes directly from the concavity of the utility function, all its arguments
being negative.
A priori, the most natural restriction for the reference income is to be not lower than
the legal one and not higher than the initial one (w − t(w) ≤ R(w) ≤ w). Indeed, this
corresponds to the case of a taxpayer whose ﬁnal income will exceed the legal income
while remaining below the initial one. The taxpayer derives an obvious disutility from
paying the legal tax. Following the reasonings for the legal income and the initial income,
it can be proved that, in a revenue maximising framework, i) the probability function is
non-increasing, ii) the tax function is non-decreasing, and iii) the interval on which the
utility function is convex is larger when the reference income increases. Therefore, the
conditions for the tax function to be concave become less restrictive.
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5 Conclusions
Following the growing interest in behavioural models able to solve the paradoxes in the
standard EUT taxation literature, we characterise the optimal income tax and audit
schemes when tax evasion decisions of taxpayers follow Prospect Theory. Our results are
in line with the basic intuition in Mirrlees (1971) about tax progressivity.18 Regardless
of the desire, in democratic societies, for progressive taxation, the tax administration
has to be cautious when choosing the tax function. The limited-information framework
in which the administration operates, together with the cost of audit, limits the action
space of the administration. Taxpayers enjoy an informational rent, which appears in
the form of a concave tax function, because this incentivises taxpayers to declare all
their income, and therefore the cost of audit shrinks. This result appears, for the case
of Expected Utility Theory, in Chander and Wilde (1998) at least when agents utility
shows Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion.
The fact that Prospect theory seems to predict a diﬀerent behaviour of tax payers
that seems more consistent with empirical observation, induced us to wonder if the pre-
vious results in the literature concerning tax progressivity still hold. Actually, they are
even reinforced, since the conditions under which the optimal tax function has to be
concave are weakened. This is because reference dependence reduces the diﬀerence in
the optimal behaviour of agents with diﬀerent incomes. In other words, when taxpayers'
payoﬀ depends on the distance from a reference point, the incentives that the tax ad-
ministration can provide are less eﬀective (it is harder to target a subset of taxpayers).
As a consequence, the rent that must be left to wealthier agents not to evade is larger,
that is, it is more likely that the tax function will need to be concave.
Similarly to what is found in the previous theoretical literature, larger penalties for
misreporting can be an alternative and eﬀective instrument to reduce misreporting by
deterrence instead of audit. Higher penalties may, nevertheless, increase the incentives for
corruption and generate larger costs of collecting ﬁnes, trials and convictions, therefore it
may even be suboptimal to increase punishment.19 In here, we disregard these possible
extra costs, hence, to avoid the equilibrium in which the punishment is suﬃciently large
to deter evasion, we invoked the usual limited-liability argument (which goes together
with the punishment ﬁtting the crime one), and assume a binding cap to the penalty
that can be inﬂicted. In our model, any reduction in the ﬁne (below the cap) would
increase the incentives for misreporting, hence, to compensate, the optimal tax scheme
should be even more progressive.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote by χ the function deﬁned by the second feasibility
requirement:
χ(w) = argmaxx∈X(w) [(1− p(x))u(w − t(x)−R(w)) + p(x)u(w − f(w, x)−R(w))] .(15)
Then, at each w ∈ [0, w¯], the scheme (t, p, f) associates (t(χ(w)), p(χ(w)), f(w,χ(w))).
Denote by (t
′
, p
′
, f
′
) the scheme such that for all w ∈ [0, w¯],
(t
′
(w), p
′
(w), f
′
(w,w)) = (t(χ(w)), p(χ(w)), f(w,χ(w))).
Using the deﬁnition of χ, we have:
(1− p′(w))u(w − t′(w)−R(w)) + p′(w)u(w − f ′(w,w)−R(w)) ≥
(1− p′(x))u(w − t′(x)−R(w)) + p′(x)u(w − f ′(w, x)−R(w)), for all x ∈ X(w).
18See Tuomala (2010) for a discussion of Mirrlees (1971) and its drawbacks.
19We are grateful to Ali Al-Nowaihi for pointing this out.
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(X, t
′
, p
′
, f
′
) is an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism and (t
′
, p
′
, f
′
) is
equivalent because the utility of each agent is maximised.
Proof of Lemma 1. We can weaken the constraint by rising f(w, x). This is possible
as long as f(w, x) < w, and up to f(w, x) = w, for which equations (7) and (8) are
equivalent.
In addition, the payment function is r(w) = (1−p(w))t(w)+p(w)f(w,w), the constraint
is then equivalent to:
p(w)u
(
t(w)− r(w)
p(w)
)
− (1− p(x))u(t(w)− t(x))− p(x)u(t(w)− w) ≥ 0.
The function φ(t) = p(w)u
(
t−r
p(w)
)
− (1 − p(x))u(t − t(x)) − p(x)u(t − w) is increasing
with t when t is smaller but suﬃciently close to r, for all r > 0. Then, the constraint
can be weakened by rising t(w), while keeping constant the payment r(w). That is, the
constraint can be weakened by decreasing f(w,w) and rising t(w), while keeping constant
the payment r(w), as long as f(w,w) > t(w). The conditions in (7) and (8) are then
equivalent when f(w,w) = t(w) = r(w).
Notice that, as speciﬁed at page 4, f : [0, w¯]×X → R+, meaning that the ﬁne is always
weakly positive (the public authority does not distribute money to audited taxpayers
who declared their real income.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that w ∈ [0, w¯] exists such that for all x ∈ X(w), the
following inequality holds: (1− p(x))u(t(w)− t(x)) + p(x)u(t(w)− w) < 0.
Because u is increasing, t
′
such that t
′
(w) > t(w), t
′
(x) = t(x) for all x ∈ X(w) \ {w}
and
(1− p(x))u(t′(w)− t′(x)) + p(x)u(t′(w)− w) < 0,
can then be considered. This contradicts the eﬃciency of (t, p) in F.
Proof of Proposition 2.
• Suppose that there exists w,w′ ∈ [0, w¯] such that w < w′ and t is decreasing on
[w,w
′
]. According to Lemma 2, there exists x
′ ∈ X(w′) such that the incentive
constraint (8) for w
′
is binding at x
′
. By the incentive constraint (8) for w,
(1− p(x′))u(t(w)− t(x′)) + p(x′)u(t(w)− w) ≤ 0,
and, because u is increasing,
(1− p(x′))u(t(w′)− t(x′)) + p(x′)u(t(w′)− w′) < 0.
This contradicts the fact that for w
′
, (8) is binding at x
′
.
• According to (8), for all x ∈ X, for all w ∈ [0, w¯] such that x ∈ X(w),
p(x) ≥ u(t(w)− t(x))
u(t(w)− t(x))− u(t(w)− w) .
Then, (t, p) being eﬃcient,
p(x) = sup
w>t(x)
u(t(w)− t(x))
u(t(w)− t(x))− u(t(w)− w) .
t is non-decreasing, p is thus non-increasing. If there exists x ∈ X which does not
belong to any X(w), w ∈ [0, w¯], then, according to (8), p(z) = 0 for all z ≥ x.
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Proof of Lemma 3. Let there be some wˆ ∈ [0, w¯].
• The slope of lwˆ is t′(wˆ). Indeed, for all w ∈ [0, w¯], the ﬁrst order Taylor expansion
of t near wˆ is:
t(w) = t(wˆ) + t
′
(wˆ)(w − wˆ) + r1(w), with r1(w) w − wˆ (when w → wˆ).
Since lwˆ is an aﬃne function which crosses t in wˆ, lwˆ(w) = t(wˆ) + λ(w − wˆ). For
all w ∈ [0, w¯], lwˆ(w) ≥ t(w), then:
λ(w − wˆ) ≥ t′(wˆ)(w − wˆ) + r1(w).
For all w > wˆ, λ ≥ t′(wˆ) + r0(w), with r0(w) 1, then λ ≥ t′(wˆ),
for all w < wˆ, λ ≤ t′(wˆ) + r0(w), with r0(w) 1, then λ ≤ t′(wˆ), then λ = t′(wˆ).
• For all w ∈ [0, w¯], lwˆ(w) = t(wˆ) + t′(wˆ)(w − wˆ). In addition, the second order
Taylor expansion of t near wˆ is:
t(w) = t(wˆ) + t
′
(wˆ)(w − wˆ) + t′′(wˆ)(w − wˆ)
2
2
+ r2(w),
with r2(w) (w − wˆ)2.
lwˆ(w) ≥ t(w), then t′′(wˆ) (w−wˆ)
2
2 + r2(w) ≤ 0, then t
′′
(wˆ) ≤ 0. This is veriﬁed for
all wˆ ∈ [0, w¯], t is then concave on [0, w¯].
Proof of Proposition 3. Let there be some wˆ ∈ [0, w¯]. Since (t, p) is eﬃcient, accord-
ing to Lemma 2, it exists some xˆ ∈ [0, w¯] such that t(xˆ) ≤ wˆ and (1 − p(xˆ))u(t(wˆ) −
t(xˆ)) + p(xˆ)u(t(wˆ)− wˆ) = 0. Three cases arise from the value of p(xˆ).
• First case: p(xˆ) = 0, then u(t(wˆ) − t(xˆ)) = 0, then t(wˆ) = t(xˆ). In addition,
according to the incentive constraints (8), for all w ∈ [0, w¯], u(t(w)−t(xˆ)) ≤ 0, then
t(w) ≤ t(xˆ). The (constant) aﬃne function lwˆ(w) = t(xˆ) satisﬁes the assumptions
of Lemma 3.
• Second case: p(xˆ) = 1, then u(t(wˆ)−wˆ) = 0, then t(wˆ) = wˆ. Then, since t(w) ≤ w,
for all w ∈ [0, w¯], the aﬃne function lwˆ(w) = w satisﬁes the assumptions of Lemma
3.
• Third case: 0 < p(xˆ) < 1, since u satisﬁes DARA, the curve Cp(xˆ) deﬁned by:
(1− p(xˆ))u(y) + p(xˆ)u(−z) = 0
is increasing and convex in the coordinate system (0, y, z). Denote by Φˆ the asso-
ciated function and let there be some zˆ ∈ [0, w¯]. Denote by yˆ the real number such
that Φˆ(yˆ) = zˆ. The tangent to Cp(xˆ) at yˆ in (0, y, z) is below itself. Denote by kˆ
the function associated to the tangent:
kˆ(y) = a(y − y˜), with kˆ(yˆ) = Φˆ(yˆ) = zˆ, y˜ ∈ [0, w¯], and a > 0.
For all z ∈ [0, w¯] such that (1 − p(xˆ))u(y) + p(xˆ)u(−z) ≤ 0, kˆ(y) ≤ Φˆ(y) ≤ z,
because u is increasing.
Consider z = w − t(w), zˆ = wˆ − t(wˆ), yˆ = t(wˆ) − t(xˆ) and y = t(w) − t(xˆ),
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(1− p(xˆ))u(y) + p(xˆ)u(−z) ≤ 0 according to (8) and
(1− p(xˆ))u(yˆ) + p(xˆ)u(−zˆ) = 0, then the aﬃne function:
lwˆ(w) =
w + a(t(xˆ) + y˜)
a+ 1
satisﬁes the assumptions of Lemma 3.
This is veriﬁed for all wˆ ∈ [0, w¯], t is then concave on [0, w¯], according to Lemma 3.
Proof of Lemma 4. We can weaken the constraint by rising f(w, x). This is possible
as long as f(w, x) < w, and up to f(w, x) = w, for which equations (13) and (14) are
equivalent.
In addition, the payment function is r(w) = (1−p(w))t(w)+p(w)f(w,w), the constraint
is then equivalent to:
(1−p(w))u(−t(w))+p(w)u
(
r(w)− (1− p(w))t(w)
p(w)
)
−(1−p(x))u(−t(x))−p(x)u(−w) ≥ 0.
The function ψ(t) = (1 − p(w))u(−t) + p(w)u
(
r−(1−p(w))t
p(w)
)
− (1 − p(x))u(−t(x)) −
p(x)u(−w) is increasing with t when t is smaller but suﬃciently close to r, for all r > 0.
Then, the constraint can be weakened by rising t(w), while keeping constant the payment
r(w). That is, the constraint can be weakened by decreasing f(w,w) and rising t(w),
while keeping constant the payment r(w), as long as f(w,w) > t(w). The conditions in
(13) and (14) are then equivalent when f(w,w) = t(w) = r(w).
Proof of Proposition 4.
• Let us suppose that there exists w,w′ ∈ [0, w¯] such that w < w′ and t is decreasing
on [w,w
′
]. According to Lemma 5, there exists x
′ ∈ X(w′) such that the incentive
constraints (14) for w
′
are binding at x
′
. But according to the incentive constraints
(14) for w,
u(−t(w)) ≥ (1− p(x′))u(−t(x′)) + p(x′)u(−w).
u being increasing and t being decreasing on [w,w
′
], the following function is
increasing on [w,w
′
] :
ψ(v) = u(−t(v))− (1− p(x′))u(−t(x′))− p(x′)u(−v).
Then, ψ(w
′
) > ψ(w) > 0, which contradicts the fact that the constraints (14) for
w
′
are binding at x
′
.
• According to (14), for all x ∈ X, for all w ∈ [0, w¯] such that x ∈ X(w),
p(x) ≥ u(−t(x))− u(−t(w))
u(−t(x))− u(−w) .
Then, (t, p) being eﬃcient,
p(x) = sup
w>t(x)
u(−t(x))− u(−t(w))
u(−t(x))− u(−w) .
t is non-decreasing, p is thus non-increasing. If there exists x ∈ X which does not
belong to any X(w), w ∈ [0, w¯], then, according to (14), p(z) = 0 for all z ≥ x.
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As for the concavity, let there be some wˆ ∈ [0, w¯]. Since (t, p) is eﬃcient, ac-
cording to Lemma 5, it exists some xˆ ∈ [0, w¯] such that t(xˆ) ≤ wˆ and u(−t(wˆ)) =
(1− p(xˆ))u(−t(xˆ)) + p(xˆ)u(−wˆ). Three cases arise from the value of p(xˆ).
• First case: p(xˆ) = 0, then u(−t(wˆ)) = u(t(−xˆ)), then t(wˆ) = t(xˆ). In addition,
according to (14), for all w ∈ [0, w¯], u(−t(w)) ≥ u(−t(xˆ)), then t(w) ≤ t(xˆ). The
(constant) aﬃne function lwˆ(w) = t(xˆ) satisﬁes the assumptions of Lemma 3.
• Second case: p(xˆ) = 1, then u(−t(wˆ)) = u(−wˆ), then t(wˆ) = wˆ. Then, since
t(w) ≤ w, for all w ∈ [0, w¯], the aﬃne function lwˆ(w) = w satisﬁes the assumptions
of Lemma 3.
• Third case: 0 < p(xˆ) < 1, then, u being convex on R∗−, for all w ∈ [0, w¯],
u(−t(w)) ≥ (1− p(xˆ))u(−t(xˆ)) + p(xˆ)u(−w) ≥ u (−(1− p(xˆ))t(xˆ)− p(xˆ)w) ,
then, t(w) ≤ lwˆ(w), where lwˆ is the aﬃne function deﬁned by lwˆ(w) = (1 −
p(xˆ))t(xˆ) + p(xˆ)w.
In addition, following the incentive constraints (14), the expected utility for the
initial income wˆ is maximised by xˆ. The payment when declaring xˆ is then lower
than the one when declaring truthfully, that is:
r(wˆ, xˆ) = (1− p(xˆ))t(xˆ) + p(xˆ)wˆ ≤ r(wˆ) = t(wˆ),
then t(wˆ) = lwˆ(wˆ).
This is veriﬁed for all wˆ ∈ [0, w¯], t is then concave on [0, w¯], according to Lemma 3.
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